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 Th ree newly established public agencies built regional rail 
projects in Los Angeles County from 1978 to 2002. Th e 
Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, the Los 
Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and the 
Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority were experi-
ments in regional governance. Conventional understand-
ing of these agencies only partially explains their successes 
and failures. One path to improved understanding is 
to combine research on the politics of designing new 
public agencies with research on cooperation in collec-
tive action problems. What emerges is an untold story 
of American politics: the evolution of mechanisms that 
promote cooperation. Four ﬁ ndings emerge: (1) conﬂ ict 
is inevitable; (2) public agencies can succeed despite the 
problems of politics; (3) successful regional solutions are 
intensely local; and (4) cooperation emerges from supply-
side mechanisms that create new resources rather than 
reallocate existing resources. Th e limits of politics 
are neither random nor predestined — neither is the 
governance solution. 
 The future of the Los Ange-les region was sketched on a cocktail napkin in the 
lounge of the downtown New 
Otani hotel in 1978. Over dinner, 
staﬀ  from the newly formed Los 
Angeles County Transportation 
Commission drew rail corridors for 
a proposed ballot measure to in-
crease the sales tax for 8 million 
residents countywide. In retro-
spect, the meeting initiated a two-
decade departure from government 
to governance. Th e participants 
drew on a vision of governance in 
which regional cooperation would emerge out of a 
collision with competing  political constituencies. 
 In a little over a decade, the promise of a regional rail 
system collapsed as interest group conﬂ ict over-
whelmed the fragile cooperative mechanisms of gover-
nance. Upon careful examination, however, a pattern 
emerges from what otherwise might appear to be a 
chaotic set of events described by former Los Angeles 
deputy mayor Ray  Remy (1998) as “the failure of 
public administration in virtually every test.” Th e 
cases of the regional transportation agencies invite 
inquiry into two ongoing controversies regarding 
institutions and organizations: improving the under-
standing of both “ the life course of institutions ” and the 
“ relation between institutional and organizational 
 processes ” ( Scott 1995 , 146 – 47). In light of the emerg-
ing interest in researching governance ( Hill and Lynn 
2005 , 155) and with a view of governance as the 
study of “coordination and collaboration” ( Heinrich, 
Hill, and Lynn 2004 , 5), as well as the potential 
beneﬁ ts of “cooperation and competition” ( Feiock 
2004, 4 ), these cases examine governance as a product 
of institutional design that attempts to facilitate the 
beneﬁ ts of coordination and collaboration in a politi-
cal environment with intense competition among 
local governments for funding. 
 Th e three newly established 
agencies that oversaw the re-
gional projects were nothing 
less than experiments in gover-
nance, designed to overcome 
long-standing political con-
ﬂ icts. Th ese agencies were 
building a transportation infra-
structure for one of the world’s 
largest and most demographi-
cally diverse metro politan areas 
to carry it into the 21st cen-
tury. Th ese three cases are the 
story of a search for resources 
 totaling more than $12 billion in 
local, state, federal, and private funding where previ-
ously there had been no money. 
 What emerges is an untold story of American 
politics: the evolution of mechanisms that promote 
cooperation among political entities and how these 
mechanisms succeed or fail. Four major ﬁ ndings 
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Case Study
Th e future of the Los Angeles 
region was sketched on a cock-
tail napkin in the lounge of the 
downtown New Otani hotel in 
1978. … Th e participants [in 
the exercise] drew on a vision of 
governance in which regional 
cooperation would emerge out 
of a collision with competing 
 political constituencies.
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emerge: (1) conﬂ ict is inevitable; (2) public agencies 
can overcome the interest group conﬂ ict that is inher-
ent in politics; (3) successful regional solutions are 
intensely local; and (4) governance needs to address 
two parts of the political equation — the demand side 
and the supply side. 
 Th e regional transportation agencies, created between 
1978 and 1992, responded to the predictable challenges 
of building regional projects in a politically frag-
mented region. Th e degree to which the cooperative 
mechanisms developed by each agency succeeded or 
failed helps explain what long-serving Los Angeles 
County supervisor Ed  Edelman (2001) described as 
“Mayor Bradley putting together a consensus” and 
what the mayor’s transportation board appointee 
Ray  Remy (1998) characterized as the “meltdown of 
critical consensus.” Th is invites the research question: 
Can governance emerge in a politically fragmented 
environment? 
 The Limits of Current Understanding 
 Th e conventional understanding of these projects 
suggests a wide range of causes for failure. Ineﬀ ective 
executive directors, ﬁ scal oﬃ  cers who overestimated 
revenues, incompetent project managers, and overly 
inﬂ uential contractors begin the list of explanations 
for their shortcomings. Th e impact of local politi-
cians on selecting rail lines, succumbing to symbolic 
 actions, and appointing alternates instead of serving 
themselves add to the litany of proposed shortcom-
ings. Th e inevitability of cost overruns on federally 
funded new-start rail construction, the uncertainty 
of clearing federal and state environmental review 
processes, insuﬃ  cient employment densities, and 
organizational fragmentation extend the list of 
potential explanations. 
 Making explicit the intrinsic problems of political 
design potentially addresses a contemporary critique 
of the ﬁ eld of public administration, that is, its per-
ceived inattention to interesting questions of politics, 
institutions, and public organizations ( March 1997 ; 
Moe 1994, 17;  Wilson 1994 ). Research in public 
administration has inadequately advanced the study 
of complex institutional arrangements in American 
metropolitan regions (Ostrom 1998, 15). “If institu-
tions matter, then  which institutions are employed 
becomes a paramount concern. In particular, the 
selection, survival, adaptation, and evolution of insti-
tutional practices need to be understood” ( Shepsle 
1986, 52 ). In addition, there is a need to explain the 
how and why of institutional change in local govern-
ment ( Clingermayer and Feiock 2001, 6 ). 
 What remain a puzzle are the underlying causes of 
the conventional set of problems and an understand-
ing of the features of successful cooperation. A more 
systematic, theory-driven study is needed to explain 
the design and evolution of governance in politically 
complex environments. 
 Methodology: Case Study Analysis 
 Th e cases were selected according to three criteria: 
(1) a shared organizational ﬁ eld ( Scott 1995 , 56) of 
transportation; (2) shared geography and demograph-
ics of the region of Los Angeles County; and 
(3) shared responsibility for several billion dollars in 
capital project costs. Th ese criteria permit a focus on 
the speciﬁ cs of institutional development and address 
such variables as ﬁ eld, location, and costs. Th e limits 
of these criteria caution against generalizing the 
 ﬁ ndings beyond the ﬁ eld of transportation or the 
metropolitan region of Los Angeles County. 
 A case study approach is favored when seeking to 
explain the how and why of an issue ( Yin 1994, 9 ), as 
well as when exploring institutional process questions 
( Scott 1995 , 146). Th e focus on three organizations 
permits a comparison among diﬀ erent cases and 
 analysis that builds on shared ﬁ ndings. After a brief 
introduction of each case, the subsequent presentation 
is organized around key themes rather than the chro-
nology of each case. Th is approach allows comparisons 
and contrasts across major ﬁ ndings. 
 For this research, four primary sources of information 
were used: (1) interviews with key decision makers 
who were elected oﬃ  cials, board members, and agency 
executives; (2) public documents from federal, state, 
and local agencies; (3) journal articles and books 
researching the speciﬁ cs of the Los Angeles region, 
particularly transportation; and (4) contemporary 
newspaper articles. 
 Th e interviews with participants focused on their 
perceptions of seminal events and mechanisms. Th e 
limitations of individual perceptions and recollections 
of events call for the use of additional sources of infor-
mation and introduce the risk of selection basis in 
choosing interviewees. However, the narratives 
 provided by those interviewed provide an opportunity 
to “explore speciﬁ c phenomena, such as leadership 
and organizational change” ( Ospina and Dodge 2005, 
143 ). Th e use of multiple sources addresses  Yin’s 
(1994, 92) suggestion on the comparative advantage 
of using multiple sources of information to develop 
“converging lines of inquiry.” 
 The Three Cases: An Overview 
 Th e Los Angeles County Transportation Commission 
(LACTC) oﬀ ers a case study in politics designing conﬂ ict 
into the structure of an agency from the start. Th e cre-
ation of the LACTC in 1976 was seen as partly the result 
of repeated failures by the Southern California Rapid 
Transportation District (RTD) to secure new-start rail 
construction funding for a rail system from the federal 
government. Th e legislative enactment of the LACTC 
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was intended, in the words of legislative staﬀ  member D. 
J.  Smith (2000) , to allow the LACTC to “wrestle con-
trol” of transportation policy making from two existing 
regional agencies: the RTD and the Southern California 
 Association of Governments. Th e LACTC became 
responsible for receiving 1978 Proposition A funds, a 
measure that created a local half-cent sales tax to ﬁ nance 
regional rail construction, providing a share to the RTD 
for subway construction and bus operations and allocat-
ing much of the remaining funds for construction 
of LACTC’s light rail lines. 
 Th is arrangement left the region with two parallel 
transportation agencies, the RTD and LACTC, each 
in charge of massive public works construction proj-
ects. Both relied on a mixture of federal, state, and 
local funds, and both had nearly identical elected 
oﬃ  cials appointing their representatives to serve on 
their boards of directors, though the agencies diverged 
wildly in their policy choices, as noted by longtime 
board member Marvin  Holen (1997) and former 
LACTC executive director Neil Peterson (2000). 
Starting in the mid-1980s, a series of eﬀ orts began 
to consolidate the agencies. 
 Th e second case study begins in 1992, when the RTD 
and LACTC were merged though legislation spon-
sored by Los Angeles – area state senator Richard Katz. 
As a result, the largest public works project in the 
United States became the responsibility of a newly 
created agency, the Metropolitan Transit Agency 
(MTA). Th e MTA is a case study in the breakdown of 
the promise to build all the lines drawn on the napkin 
in the New Otani hotel and promised to the 8 million 
residents of Los Angeles County. 
 According to  Katz (2000) , the goals of the merger 
were to improve accountability and to reduce conﬂ ict 
between agencies in order to improve transit agency 
performance in Los Angeles, both in bus operations 
and rail construction. However, by 1998, the MTA 
had exhausted the available funding, precluding the 
construction of future lines. As prominent California 
historian Kevin Starr has noted, the funding looked 
like “Ponzi schemes the MTA had ﬁ nanced itself ” 
(2004, 556). According to an analysis conducted by 
the former controller of the RTD, “Every MTA rail 
project has had signiﬁ cant cost overruns, with some 
ﬁ nal costs running as high as four to six times the 
original planning estimates” ( Rubin, Moore, and 
Lee 1999 , 198). 
 Th e recurrence of challenges in accountability led the 
legislative sponsor of the consolidated MTA to 
 suggest — less than a decade later — that the new 
agency be broken up ( Katz 2000 ). Similarly, the 
 California Transportation Commission suggested in 
its 1998 annual report, “Th e root of the problem may 
lie in the MTA’s governing structure, which combines 
the function of a regional planning and funding 
agency with the function of a transit operating and 
construction agency” (1999, I-149). 
 Th e third agency, Th e Alameda Corridor Transpor-
tation Authority (ACTA), oﬀ ers a study in board 
members seeking political control of expenditures. 
Th e evolution of the agency reﬂ ects a movement 
toward political control in order to reduce the un-
certainty of local politics in ﬁ nancing rail construc-
tion. Th e Alameda Corridor project evolved from 
an advisory committee formed in 1980 by the 
Southern California Association of Governments 
that studied the movement of cargo from the harbors 
of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Th e advisory com-
mittee’s report led to funding for highway improve-
ments and additional study of options for improving 
the freight-rail line transporting cargo from the 
Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles to downtown 
and nearby rail yards. 
 After a feasibility study was conducted, the ACTA 
was created as a new authority to complete the 
 design, capture the needed funding, and build the 
project. A joint powers agreement between the Port 
of Los Angeles, the Port of Long Beach, and the six 
municipalities that the proposed rail-cargo line 
would run through created the Alameda Corridor 
project. Th e ACTA’s governing structure evolved 
signiﬁ cantly over the course of the project, eventu-
ally revoking  representation from any municipal 
jurisdiction that did not contribute ﬁ nancially to the 
construction. Th e ACTA’s governance structure 
evolved in response to the need to use public and 
private sector funding and debt issuance to create a 
structure that could credibly deliver the promised 
project on time and on budget. 
 An Institutional Framework for Case Analysis: 
Politics and Cooperation 
 Th e state and local elected oﬃ  cials who designed each 
of the three agencies — the LACTC, MTA, and 
ACTA — were well versed in politics. Th e politics 
included choices about representation on the govern-
ing boards, the agencies’ respective missions, and the 
authority provided to each agency. Th e evolution of 
each agency reveals the impact of politics. 
 Th e impact of political considerations on the design 
of new public agencies is central to the framework 
that Terry Moe calls the  politics of structural choice. 
Moe starts with the premise that public agencies are 
not designed to be eﬃ  cient: “Because American 
 politics is unavoidably a process of compromise, 
then, public agencies will tend to be structured in part 
by their enemies — who want them to fail” (1990a, 
230). Th e fundamental diﬀ erence of this approach 
from other institutional approaches is that the failure 
of public organizations is not incidental but deliber-
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ate — it is the product of politically rational calcula-
tions ( Schlager and Blomquist 1996 ). As institutional 
scholar Richard Scott has noted, these organizational 
designs are “rationally constructed ediﬁ ces established 
by individuals seeking to promote or protect their 
interests” (1995, 27). For rational reasons, an agency 
might not be designed to serve the public interest in 
complex settings of uncertainty, incomplete informa-
tion, and opportunism ( Zegart 1996 ). New agencies 
have features that emerge from the interplay of 
 interest groups involved in the negotiations over 
 design (Moe 1990b, 143). 
 Moe’s framework seeks parsimony to explain the 
design of public agencies through a few key features. 
Th e ﬁ ve predominant features of politics-sustaining 
competition can be summarized as follows: (1) major-
ity rule is inherently unstable, making durable agree-
ments very diﬃ  cult and opportunism potentially 
strong ( Shepsle and Weingast 1995 ); (2) the precari-
ous nature of majority rule creates incentives for the 
current majority to insulate newly formed agencies 
from subsequent politics, limiting their responsiveness 
to future majorities ( McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 
1989 , 443); (3) the need for compromise in American 
democracy typically necessitates support from oppo-
nents, structuring interest group conﬂ ict into an 
agency without procedures for resolving disagree-
ments; (4) the coercive nature of public authority 
causes citizens and opponents of newly formed 
 agencies to protect themselves from the exercise of this 
power (Moe 1991, 123), a long-standing challenge of 
democracy ( Miller 2000, 289 ); and (5) long-term 
political uncertainty places a premium on trying to 
anticipate future contingencies prior to available 
 information ( Shepsle and Weingast 1995, 23 ). 
 Suggestions about mechanisms for cooperation in the 
context of multiple and equal participants, as exists in 
the fragmentation of authority in the Los Angeles 
cases, can be found in the research literature on self-
governance of common-pool resources. In explaining 
the conditions needed to create and sustain voluntary 
cooperation, this research examines the evolution of 
rules, the processes for structuring those rules, the 
mechanisms for enforcing agreed-upon rules, and the 
sanctions for infractions ( Blomquist 1992 , xiii). 
Moreover, the institutional analysis in this tradition is 
particularly sensitive to context and the patterns of 
interactions in complex relationships ( Carlsson 2000 ). 
 Th e framework of common-pool resources research is 
not typically applied to the production of public 
goods, such as rail transit, because those goods are not 
seen as possessing the required attributes of exclusion 
and subtractability ( Tang 1992 , 4). However, shifting 
the unit of analysis from individual users to compet-
ing political jurisdictions that want to share in a com-
mon funding resource — in this case, a countywide 
dedicated sales tax — provides a case that is analogous 
to the common-pool resource problem. Overproduc-
tion by one or several municipalities could leave no 
transit resources for other municipalities. 
 Th e focus on resource-allocation decisions in common-
pool resource research helps explain the evolution of 
mechanisms that sustain cooperation ( Ostrom 1990 ). 
Th e ﬁ ve predominant features of self-organized 
 cooperation can be summarized as follows: (1) adapta-
tion, whereby agencies rely on local autonomy to craft 
solutions, with signiﬁ cant participation from all 
 appropriators; (2) credible commitment, with an 
expectation among participants that any commitment 
to future allocations will be honored; (3) conﬂ ict 
resolution, with grievance processes that respond to 
allocation, equity, enforcement, and other concerns 
among all those sharing the resource; (4) credible 
enforcement, which prevents overappropriation by 
any one user or group of users and the depletion of 
shared resources; and (5) eﬀ ective monitoring of the 
resources with an agreed-upon, neutral source of 
reliable information. 
 A rich set of ﬁ ndings has converged to explain politi-
cal institutions. Politics of structural choice theory 
takes these and ﬁ nds a variant of the Hobbesian world 
of politics: “nasty” and “brutish” but not short. 
 Likewise, well-developed research on social dilemmas 
can be seen as suggesting “a world of  possibilities 
rather than  necessity ” (Ostrom 1998, 16). Th e connec-
tion of the two sets of ﬁ ndings better explains both 
sides of the same coin of collective action problems: 
the demand side of Hobbesian failures and the supply 
side of successes without the intervention of a Levia-
than. Th e application of these two frameworks antici-
pates what otherwise appears to be a random set of 
events. 
 Hypotheses: Testing a Framework of Governance 
 Four hypotheses provide empirical tests to determine 
whether the performance limitations found in the 
politics of structural choice research can be overcome 
by the cooperative mechanisms found in common-
pool resource research. 
 H 1 : Sustained project control depends on mech-
anisms to solve the instability of majority rule 
by providing for local adaptation. 
 H 2 : Accountability derives from reducing 
agency insulation from politics while providing 
mechanisms for credible commitment. 
 H 3 : Conﬂ ict is built into regional agencies by 
political design. 
 H 4 : Agency authority needs coercive power in 
order to increase resources while developing 
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agreed-upon sanctions to prevent 
overappropriation. 
 Application of the Hypotheses to the Cases 
 Sustained project control depends on mechanisms to 
solve the instability of majority rule by providing for 
local adaptation (hypothesis 1). In the ﬁ rst case study, 
the LACTC’s passage of the countywide sales tax 
addressed the instability of majority rule. Th e seminal 
event early in the agency’s existence, the sales tax 
measure, did not have a sunset clause, making it 
unique in the state of California. Th e LACTC’s 
 success in passing the measure, particularly when 
contrasted with repeated failures by its predecessor 
agency, legally provided sustained project control over 
both the light rail and heavy rail projects by generat-
ing a local revenue source. In addition to the absence 
of a sunset clause, a second notable feature of the 
Proposition A measure stands out: It addressed spe-
ciﬁ c local conditions. Bus riders received a transit fare 
subsidy. Rail construction received a guaranteed fund-
ing stream. Each of the more than 60 municipalities 
in the county received a “local return” portion for 
transit-related projects, broadly deﬁ ned. Th e revenue 
from the LACTC’s Proposition A sales tax ballot 
measure was adapted to very speciﬁ c local conditions. 
 Th e second case study illustrates how an agency — the 
MTA, which inherited the Proposition A funding —
 found a solution to the problem of the instability of 
majority rule. Th e challenge that the MTA faced in 
sustaining control of rail construction funding derived 
partly from the expectations encouraged by the prom-
ises of Proposition A. Th e promise of new rail transit 
lines that would be accessible to neighborhoods 
throughout Los Angeles County was diﬃ  cult to fulﬁ ll. 
Th e decade between the passage of Proposition A in 
1978 and the merger of the LACTC and RTD to 
form the MTA saw the near completion of only two 
light rail lines and one segment of the downtown 
subway. Th ese projects represented only a small 
 portion of the proposed routes presented to voters in 
1978 on the Proposition A ballot map. 
 Moreover, after the expiration of the fare subsidies, 
the MTA, as the successor to the RTD, needed to 
address the expectations of bus riders served by the 
MTA. Th ough not formally the result of a vote, the 
success of the bus riders in pressing for the consent 
decree to set aside funding for higher levels of bus 
service can be seen as an extension of the majority rule 
process, through which powerful constituencies can 
overturn previously agreed-upon deals. 
 Th e third case study provides an enduring and stark 
solution to the vicissitudes of the democratic process. 
Th e major funders of the ACTA — the Ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach — gained control of the 
 governing body and prevailed in court. Removing the 
six mid-corridor city representatives from the joint 
powers authority solved the threat of instability posed 
by majority rule by eliminating the municipal coali-
tion that opposed the cities of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach and their port representatives. However, while 
insulating the joint powers authority from the insta-
bility of majority rule, the ACTA still provided for 
local adaptation. Speciﬁ cally, the authority negotiated 
two types of detailed, legal agreements with each of 
the mid-corridor cities: (1) a memorandum of under-
standing for speciﬁ c transportation-related improve-
ments in each jurisdiction at a speciﬁ c funding level, 
and (2) a memorandum of understanding that assured 
timely construction permitting by each municipality. 
Th ese two types of legally binding memoranda 
 addressed very local needs and expectations of the 
cities where the rail trench would be located. 
 Accountability derives from reducing agency insula-
tion from politics while providing mechanisms for 
credible commitment (hypothesis 2). Th e quest for 
accountability can be seen in the evolution of the 
legislation that created both the LACTC and MTA. 
Th ough enacted more than a decade apart, both bills 
initially had language requiring elected oﬃ  cials, ap-
pointed as principals, to attend board meetings, allow-
ing for no alternates. 
 Th e case of the LACTC illustrates the impact of the 
absence of mechanisms for accountability. Noticeably 
absent in the construction of Proposition A were fea-
tures to ensure that the promised rail projects would be 
built. Longtime RTD board member and former 
chairman Marvin  Holen (1997) notes that in addition 
to pressing the RTD for accountability in its spending 
on the downtown subway and bus operations, the 
LACTC’s 30-year plan further extended the time 
horizon and leveraged funding sources, but it did not 
address the fundamental diﬃ  culty of allocating re-
sources among competing claims. In many ways, Prop-
osition A and the LACTC’s plan mirrored the 
approach that William  Blomquist’s (1992) extensive 
study of Los Angeles region water basins terms the 
“California solution.” Blomquist found a repeated set 
of choices to create more common-pool resources, 
injecting river water into water basins rather than 
battling the overallocation of existing resources. For 
the LACTC, the California solution succeeded to the 
extent that the LACTC avoided accountability mecha-
nisms for ensuring that all promises for rail construc-
tion could be met. 
 Th e LACTC also did not succeed at insulating the 
agency from future legislative changes. Rather, a major 
impetus for the abolition of the LACTC resulted from 
legislative concern over its lack of accountability. Th e 
success of the California solution, with promises of 
resources to competing expropriators, came at the 
price of credible commitment. Ultimately, the cost of 
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the missing accountability mecha-
nisms was the existence of the 
agency itself. Th e merger of the 
LACTC and the RTD was driven 
by a search for better ways of ensur-
ing public accountability for spend-
ing public funds. 
 Th e cost of accountability was a bill 
that was  ultimately paid by the 
successor agency, the MTA. Th e 
agency had diﬃ  culty sustaining the 
promises of the LACTC’s 30-year 
plan and scaled back the time frame 
for construction and deliverables in an attempt to 
address the expectation of increased accountability. 
Th e hiring of a fourth director, Julian Burke, in the 
third year of the agency’s existence was the result of 
ongoing problems in resource alloca-
tion. In assuming the helm of the 
MTA,  Burke (2001) stated that he 
recognized agency credibility as the 
key problem. According to Burke, 
the imposition of a moratorium on 
new rail construction sought to 
resolve the impossibility of satisfy-
ing the four concurrent commit-
ments of the MTA to fund separate 
rail construction projects as its ﬁ rst 
priority. Th e halt on commitments 
to new rail construction became a 
mechanism for restoring credible 
commitment with federal and state funding agencies. 
In addition, the moratorium stressed the priority of 
ensuring the agency’s accountability. 
 Th e case study of the ACTA shows a preoccupation 
with accountability in the formation of the agency as 
a joint powers authority. Th e joint powers authority 
form of governance limited participation to jurisdic-
tions that were directly aﬀ ected by the rail construc-
tion. Moreover, the agency eventually excluded six 
municipal jurisdictions with construction traversing 
their downtowns. Unlike the other two case studies, 
the ACTA evolved mechanisms giving Long Beach 
and Los Angeles city and port representatives sole 
authority to approve appropriations. 
 For the ACTA, accountability emerged as a dominant 
theme because of its innovative ﬁ nancing mecha-
nisms, which were dependent on the sale of bonds. 
Investors expected a project with strict ﬁ nancial and 
construction accountability. In order to guarantee a 
suﬃ  cient revenue stream to service the debt, the 
ACTA connected the demand side for construction to 
the supply side of funding. Th e ACTA required 
 majority approval by the jurisdictions that were 
 responsible for repayment of the debt; this created 
strong incentives to contain costs (the demand side) 
and to realistically project 
future revenue streams (the 
supply side). Th e ability to sell 
the required bonds reﬂ ected 
the ACTA’s success in develop-
ing mechanisms for account-
ability through the voting 
structure, agreeing on detailed 
memoranda of understanding 
with aﬀ ected cities, and using 
design and build project con-
tracts. Th ese mechanisms 
provided accountability that 
translated into successful funding. 
 Conﬂ ict is built into regional agencies by political 
design (hypothesis 3). Conﬂ ict emerges as a dominant 
feature in each of the case studies. Th e interest groups 
vary in each of the cases, but 
conﬂ ict is ever-present. From 
the onset, each agency had 
signiﬁ cant conﬂ ict structured 
into it. Rather than resolving 
preexisting conﬂ icts, the for-
mation of these new agencies 
initially confronted increasing 
levels of conﬂ ict among com-
peting interests. Th e legislative 
sponsor, Richard  Katz (2000) , 
and staﬀ  member Caprice 
 Young (2001) both noted that 
the level of conﬂ ict in one of the 
new agencies — the MTA — ran much deeper than ever 
imagined. Th e evolution of mechanisms to resolve 
conﬂ ict varied among the agencies. Th e cases illustrate 
the results of unchecked conﬂ ict and the utility of 
mechanisms to resolve conﬂ ict. 
 Th e LACTC was literally created to wrest control of 
planning and building rail lines from the existing 
agencies. Th e minimal conﬂ ict that arose in choosing 
the initially constructed Blue Line resulted from 
the alignment of three one-time features: (1) the 
initial availability of an abundance of funds from 
Proposition A and initial low-cost construction 
 estimates; (2) an apparent consensus on the logic of 
connecting the two largest urban areas of the county, 
downtown Los Angeles and Long Beach ( Richmond 
2000 ); and (3) the political clout of those supporting 
the line selection. However, the success of  Proposition 
A at initially avoiding conﬂ ict through the promise of 
resources for everyone also deferred the need to de-
velop mechanisms for resolving grievances. Again, the 
success of the California  solution for the LACTC also 
contained the elements of the agency’s eventual 
downfall. 
 Noticeably absent in the LACTC were mechanisms to 
resolve two virulent types of conﬂ ict: demographic 
Th e success of the California 
solution, with promises of re-
sources to competing expropria-
tors, came at the price of 
credible commitment. 
Ultimately, the cost of the miss-
ing accountability mechanisms 
was the existence of the agency 
itself.
From the onset, each agency 
had signiﬁ cant conﬂ ict struc-
tured into it. Rather than re-
solving preexisting conﬂ icts, the 
formation of these new agencies 
initially confronted increasing 
levels of conﬂ ict among com-
peting interests.
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and interagency conﬂ ict. Because of the Proposition A 
map, residents in various regions of the county had 
diﬀ erent expectations of the new rail lines. Th e reali-
ties of the line-selection process, construction costs, 
and staﬃ  ng requirements made the construction of all 
the promised lines impossible. Former undersecretary 
of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Mortimer 
 Downey (2001) , noted at the time that overexpendi-
tures were not atypical for new-start rail construction 
throughout the country (GAO 1998). 
 As the successor agency, the MTA had no mechanisms 
in place to anticipate or successfully resolve conﬂ ict. 
Th e merger of the two agencies was seen as one means 
of resolving their diﬀ erences. Th e most noticeable 
evidence of the failure of mechanisms for allocation 
decisions led to bus rider discontent, a long-standing 
RTD concern, according to board member Marvin 
 Holen (1997) and former executive staﬀ  member 
Ralph De La Cruz (2001). Competition both within 
and outside the agency between advocates of rail 
construction funding and advocates of bus operations 
funding prevented the establishment of a procedure 
for resolving their diﬀ erences. Rather, the court-
 supervised consent decree requiring levels of bus 
funding emerged in the absence of any 
MTA- managed process. 
 In the ACTA case, the governance model initially 
included conﬂ ict among those paying for the project, 
the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and the six 
mid-corridor cities through which the rail lines would 
be built. Only after the cities of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach prevailed in a court battle to remove the other 
six cites and detailed agreements were reached on 
improvement funding in each excluded city did the 
conﬂ ict end. 
 Agency authority needs coercive power to increase 
resources while developing agreed-upon sanctions to 
prevent overappropriation (hypothesis 4). Th e prob-
lem of spending more than was appropriated became 
paramount. Matching the projected revenue stream to 
the projects for each agency challenged the leadership 
in all three cases. Th e concept of sanctions from 
 common-pool resource management research helps 
explain how this problem was overcome. Th e three 
cases illustrate the evolution of varied approaches to a 
similar problem. 
 Th e LACTC case study demonstrates the limits of 
promising increased appropriations to meet each of 
the competing needs. Th e LACTC’s evolution is 
 notable for its absence of mechanisms to prevent 
overappropriation of resources. Th rough Proposition 
A, the agency succeeded in gaining coercive public 
authority — in this case, sales tax authority — to 
 increase appropriations. In creating the new resource, 
the LACTC did not develop mechanisms to prevent 
early expropriators from exceeding initially agreed-
upon limits. Th e escalating cost of the initial LACTC 
rail line from downtown Los Angeles to Long Beach 
not only resulted from additional construction items 
but also the absence of any agreed-upon sanctions for 
expropriators. Rather than reduce ﬁ nancial commit-
ments, the executive director, Neil  Peterson (2001) , 
used the 30-year plan to deliberately leverage addi-
tional funding though bond ﬁ nancing, borrowing 
against future sales tax revenues. In the absence of 
local mechanisms to prevent the initial projects from 
exhausting the common resource of sales tax revenues, 
legislation was passed to set aside funding for the 
San Fernando Valley. 
 Th e case of the MTA illustrates the results of deferring 
sanctions for expropriators. All new projects were 
placed on hold. Th is action addressed future construc-
tion but did not lead to sanctions against the beneﬁ -
ciaries of overappropriations. But the moratorium did 
begin a process that connected allocations to available 
current resources. 
 However, the limits of the moratorium in preventing 
excess appropriations can be seen in the movement by 
civic leaders of the area north of downtown to create 
their own authority, with a speciﬁ c percentage of sales 
tax revenue allocated to extend the construction of the 
Blue Line to Pasadena. Also, the passage of a county-
wide proposition in 1998 to prohibit expenditures on 
construction extending the newly completed 18-mile 
subway can be seen as compensation for past overap-
propriations, though at the expense of promised 
projects. 
 Th e case of the Alameda Corridor demonstrates the 
successful linkage of appropriations and sanctions. 
Th e seminal event of the ACTA case — the forcible 
removal of the six mid-corridor cities — directly ad-
dressed the problem of overcommitment of resources 
by parties that were not contributing resources. Th e 
ACTA case demonstrates the evolution of mechanisms 
that gave the appropriators, the ports and cities of 
Los Angeles and Long Beach, direct control over the 
appropriations. Removing the mid-corridor cities 
removed votes for appropriations that would not 
be paid for by those cities. 
 ACTA’s dependence on funding through bonds 
backed only by the proceeds of future revenues eﬀ ec-
tively guarded against the overcommitment of appro-
priations. Potential investors would have been scared 
away by expenditures exceeding realistic projections of 
revenue from freight charges for corridor use over the 
next 30 years. Th is investor ﬂ ight would have neces-
sitated higher interest rates in order to attract invest-
ment, in turn increasing repayment costs and driving 
lifetime project costs even further beyond the reach of 
revenue projections. Without limiting appropriations, 
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this upward spiral would have resulted in either a lack 
of funds to start construction or a need for funding 
from other agencies and a loss of project control by 
the ports and cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach. 
Project control and construction through bond 
 ﬁ nancing linked the demand side of politics to 
the supply side of resource allocation. Th e success of 
the ACTA resulted from connecting both sides 
of the equation. 
 Findings 
 Four major ﬁ ndings emerge from these case studies: 
 1.  Terry Moe’s theory is supported in one respect: 
Interest group politics lead to agency design that 
structures conﬂ ict into the organizations. Th e cases 
show that conﬂ ict is inevitable — not the  accidental 
by-product of insuﬃ  cient deliberation or the 
 absence of intelligent foresight. 
 2.  One aspect of Terry Moe’s theory is not supported: 
Out of the Hobbesian world of the politics of 
structural choice, public agencies are not inevitable 
failures. Th ough aﬀ ected by conﬂ ict and the other 
baggage of political design, public agencies can 
nonetheless evolve nested institutional solutions 
that concurrently address political design problems. 
 3.  Successful regional solutions are intensely local. 
 4.  Th e California solution of solving allocation 
 dilemmas by importing more resources was a strat-
egy employed to solve design problems in two of 
the three agencies studied.  
 Th e ﬁ rst ﬁ nding is that conﬂ ict was a predictable 
feature in each of these cases. Th e creation of the 
LACTC intentionally placed the new agency in 
 conﬂ ict with the existing transit agency, the RTD, 
and the existing regional planning agency, Southern 
California Association of Governments. Th e MTA 
intended to resolve conﬂ ict by merging the LACTC 
and RTD, but it became mired in internal conﬂ ict 
between two radically diﬀ erent organizational cultures 
and external conﬂ ict with funding agencies, areas 
competing for new lines, and bus riders. Th e case 
study of ACTA provides a vivid illustration of bitter 
conﬂ ict between competing political jurisdictions: the 
port cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach versus the 
six mid-corridor cities. Th e ACTA case illustrates the 
success of the supply-side California solution in solv-
ing the demand-side problems of conﬂ ict, as well as 
the success of new mechanisms speciﬁ c to local needs. 
 Each agency developed diﬀ erent mechanisms to ad-
dress the conﬂ ict inherent in its design. Th e LACTC 
developed Proposition A to provide resources to com-
peting interest groups: fare subsidies for bus riders, 
transportation funding for local municipalities, rail 
lines to every region in the Los Angeles County for 
commuters, and a subway in downtown Los Angeles 
for the business community. Th e MTA executive 
director imposed a moratorium on new-start con-
struction to abate internal conﬂ icts between rail 
builders and planners in the new agency and transit 
operators, as well as external diﬀ erences among the 
various regions that wanted new rail starts, the bus 
riders who wanted better bus service, and engineering 
and construction ﬁ rms that wanted more contracts. 
Th en – executive director Gill  Hicks (2001) described a 
process in which the ACTA eventually had to remove 
the mid-corridor cities as voting members of the 
authority in order to proceed. 
 Th e second ﬁ nding that connects the cases is that 
solutions were not linear in addressing one problem 
after another sequentially. Rather, the mechanisms 
evolved and responded simultaneously to several 
conditions needed for cooperation, providing nested 
solutions to problems. In the LACTC case, the 
 development of Proposition A addressed problems of 
conﬂ ict by allocating resources to all competing con-
stituencies, by responding to the problems of control 
by not having a sunset provision typical of other sales 
tax measures, and by acquiring authority through 
local taxing powers. 
 Th e action of the executive director of the MTA in 
imposing a new construction moratorium simultane-
ously responded to the conditions of accountability 
and uncertainty while buying time to respond to 
paralyzing internal and external conﬂ icts. In the third 
case study, the ACTA’s detailed memoranda of under-
standing with the mid-corridor cities addressed the 
problems of conﬂ ict through the California solution 
of directing new resources to competing interests. 
 Th e third ﬁ nding related to each case involves local 
adaptation mechanisms. Each case study exhibits 
speciﬁ c solutions that were unique to the context of 
the newly created public agency. In addition, each 
agency developed mechanisms speciﬁ c to the region 
and diﬀ erent from similar agencies in the state of 
California. In some cases, the mechanisms were novel 
to transportation agencies in the United States. Th e 
LACTC’s sales tax proposition lacked a sunset provi-
sion, unlike any other agency in the state. Th e MTA’s 
moratorium was described by former executive direc-
tor John  Dyer (2001) as a nationally unique step, as 
was the federal funding concept of minimal operating 
segments inherited from the RTD. Th e third case 
study of the ACTA demonstrates several solutions that 
were speciﬁ c to the Alameda Corridor project, includ-
ing the use of design and build construction contracts 
in the region. Also, the ACTA’s employment of user 
fees and container fees leveraged federal funding and 
guarantees needed for private investment in bonds 
( Agarwal, Giuliano, and Redfearn 2004 , 12). 
 Th e fourth ﬁ nding from each case is the connection of 
demand-side politics and supply-side cooperation to 
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augment resources. Th e LACTC provided transporta-
tion funds to each of the municipalities in the county, 
fare subsidies to bus riders, and promises of rail lines 
to nearly every neighborhood. Th e ACTA funded 
sought-after projects in each of the mid-corridor 
cities, provided jobs to local residents, oﬀ ered contract 
 opportunities to local businesses, 
and mitigated contaminated soil 
and water along the corridor. 
Credibility emerged as an impor-
tant consideration, not simply in 
an abstract sense but in the ways 
decision makers personally re-
lated to each other. Long-stand-
ing personal relationships 
characterized the interaction of 
leading decision makers. In the 
LACTC, the ﬁ rst executive direc-
tor, Jerry Premo, who had previ-
ously worked at the U.S. 
Department of Transportation, was 
perceived as having credibility with funding agencies 
at both the federal and state levels. Th e credibility of 
Julian Burke with the undersecretary of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Mort Downey, was an 
important element in the MTA’s moratorium, as 
Burke emphasized ﬁ scal credibility with all funding 
partners and the MTA’s board of directors. In the 
third case study of the ACTA, the long-standing pro-
fessional credibility of the initial project director, Gill 
Hicks, and the SCAG Director, Mark Pisano, with 
federal, state, and local partners contributed signiﬁ -
cantly to the emergence of cooperation. 
 Implications of the Research 
 Th e untold story of the three public agencies studied 
shows that conﬂ ict is endemic and that mechanisms 
for cooperation are contextual. In short, history and 
local circumstances provide both the sources of the 
conﬂ ict that is inherent in politics and the sources of 
the solutions that can evolve in order for cooperation 
to emerge. Th e ﬁ ndings in these cases suggest that 
regional governance is not a ﬂ ight from politics but an 
evolution of mechanisms that respond to competing 
interests. What determines the success or failure of 
governance is not the presence of interest group 
 conﬂ ict but rather the mechanisms for cooperation 
that evolve in the presence of that conﬂ ict. 
 A second implication is that the three cases empiri-
cally support the application of the combined 
 theories. Th e theories anticipate the types of problems 
that dominate agency actions. Th e application of the 
combined theories helps to explain how problems of 
regional cooperation in a political environment are 
solved or not solved in terms of the ﬁ ve proposed 
features. Rather than producing an overwhelming set 
of particulars, the combination of two distinct 
 research traditions — the politics of structural choice 
and common-pool resource management — reduces 
the set of variables that explain the governance perfor-
mance of each agency. Th e varied sets of results found 
in these case studies are anticipated and explained by a 
framework that synthesizes the major features found 
in the politics of structural choice and common-pool 
resource research ﬁ ndings. Th is 
combined framework identiﬁ es 
the explanatory variables and 
provides a more robust frame-
work for understanding the 
 outcome variables. 
 A third implication is that a 
focus on mechanisms moves well 
beyond the study of organiza-
tional or governance structures, 
suggesting that the structural 
emphasis on consolidations by 
metropolitan government advo-
cates is an illusory solution. Th e 
consolidation of agencies in the MTA case study does 
not show that consolidation solves preexisting con-
ﬂ ict. Conﬂ ict continued at the staﬀ  level and with 
outside contractors, undermining the public’s percep-
tion of the agency. Th e level of animosity between the 
two agencies was not accounted for in the legislation 
that  created the MTA. Th e complex politics of the 
region worked against solutions that did not provide 
resources to each of the competing interest groups and 
subregions. Consequently, consolidation into a new 
organizational structure was insuﬃ  cient to resolve 
conﬂ ict. 
 Th is combined framework helps to explain why savvy, 
seasoned public managers with signiﬁ cant political 
acumen, such as John Dyer and Neil Peterson, are 
eventually overtaken by the politics of the region. Th e 
combined research framework also explains why new 
executive directors and consolidated organizations do 
not necessarily produce better cooperation. More than 
taxonomy, the synthesized framework anticipates the 
leadership challenges that must be addressed in a 
political environment in order for cooperation to 
emerge across political jurisdictions. Th e ﬁ ndings here 
suggest that the leadership challenges of executive 
directors in newly designed public agencies require 
not only interpersonal and organizational-level leader-
ship skills but also the ability to negotiate at the 
 institutional level. Th e agencies’ success at securing 
local and federal funding for each of the projects 
reﬂ ects both horizontal and vertical leadership skill 
sets — critical for negotiating among competing 
 jurisdictions, on one hand, and among the public, 
regional agencies, the state, and the federal govern-
ment, on the other hand. In addition, the ACTA 
case suggests the need for intersectoral skills to lever-
age public monies in order to attract private sector 
capital. 
Credibility emerged as an im-
portant consideration, not sim-
ply in an abstract sense but in 
the ways decision makers per-
sonally related to each other. 
Long-standing personal rela-
tionships characterized the in-
teraction of leading decision 
makers.
The Collision of Politics and Cooperation  299 
 Future Research 
 Th e use of institutional analysis in the three case 
 studies shows the potential of expanding the concepts 
and terminology developed in the research on public 
agency design to explain the impact of political design 
on new governance approaches. Th e case studies also 
show the potential of applying the research on the 
evolution of mechanisms for cooperation to regional 
governance challenges. Although not always found in 
the study of governance, the mechanisms that evolved 
are key to explaining what occurred in these cases. 
 Future research should apply the four conditions 
found in these three case studies in a larger empirical 
test. Research needs to move beyond one region and 
one ﬁ eld to test the hypotheses in diﬀ erent geographic 
locations, diﬀ erent policy domains, and smaller agen-
cies, as well as large-scale agencies. Th e suggestion of a 
“California solution” — adding more resources to solve 
the demand-side competition of politics in governance —
 should be researched in other geographic regions, 
testing supply-side solutions in promoting coopera-
tion across competing local jurisdictions. Also, the 
data collection could be expanded to include more 
comprehensive surveys of key decision makers. 
 Additional research could be done by testing the four 
conditions for cooperation across a variety of single-
purpose and multipurpose regional governance 
agencies and councils of governments, as well as 
newly designed federal agencies. 
 Future research also could focus on public managers 
in these politically charged environments — speciﬁ -
cally, how they navigate and negotiate newly and 
deliberately designed institutional constraints. Ques-
tions about the leadership skills needed in these envi-
ronments provide a new way of framing leadership 
 research, moving beyond endless contingency theory, 
with its countless maps and categories of leadership 
skills needed in the public sector. 
 Conclusion 
 Th e three cases oﬀ er a rich portrait of the dynamic 
features of American politics and 
the evolution of mechanisms for 
cooperation. Th e forces that were 
present when each agency was 
created continued to shape their 
evolution. Th eir initial design, 
however, was not their destiny. 
For each agency, seminal events 
shaped the evolution of the 
multibillion-dollar  projects they 
were charged with building. Th e 
success of the LACTC in Proposition A became a 
source of expectations that were not met. Th e MTA 
faced a level of expectation that had to be reshaped 
through a moratorium. Th e ACTA’s evolution solved 
the varied conditions needed for eﬀ ective cooperation 
through a variety of mechanisms. Varied new mecha-
nisms were developed for each project. 
 Th e framework applied in the study of these cases 
eﬀ ectively anticipated the types of problems each 
agency had to overcome. In eﬀ ect, the framework 
anticipated the limits of political design and the 
 potential for cooperation to evolve through the devel-
opment of certain features. Th e utility of these 
 theories in anticipating the wide range of successes 
and failures proved an exciting feature of the research. 
Rather than a collection of inexplicable events, the 
framework provided a useful focus on variables that 
could explain the emergence of cooperation in a 
 political environment. Rather than random occur-
rences, the actions of each of the agencies responded 
to the limits that the politics of design placed on 
them. Th e evolution of cooperative mechanisms that 
solved the problems of politics explained an impor-
tant part of the performance of each agency. 
 When drawing future rail lines on a cocktail napkin at 
dinner in downtown Los Angeles in 1978, the partici-
pants could not have anticipated the governance 
challenges that would unfold over the next two de-
cades. But their bold invitation to build a regional rail 
 system initiated an opportunity to develop regional 
governance mechanisms to address the realities of 
politics. Th e three cases illustrate the complexities of 
politics and the challenges of cooperation in political 
contexts. Th e evolution of the cases shows the impor-
tance of the local context and the possibility of the 
evolution of unique adaptations. Th e presence of 
conﬂ ict did not forestall the emergence of varied 
governance solutions to address the cooperation 
needed to work across political jurisdictions. Th e cases 
suggest that even though public agencies may not be 
designed to be eﬀ ective — 
politics inevitably entails conﬂ ict — cooperation can 
nonetheless emerge and evolve. Th e limits of politics 
are not random or predestined. Likewise, the 
emergence of sustainable governance is neither ran-
dom nor preordained. 
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